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Richard G. Heck, Jr.
1. Opening: What is a Fregean View of Referring Expressions?
Fregean views of referring expressions—according to which
such expressions have, not only reference, but also sense—
have been subjected to intense criticism over the last few
decades.  Frege's view of proper names has been shown to
face serious difficulties;1  but these become even worse if one
attempts to defend a Fregean account of demonstratives and
indexicals.2  Consider the word 'today' and ask what the
sense of any particular utterance of a sentence containing it
should be taken to be.  If anything can be supposed to be the
sense of an utterance of, say, 'Today is cold', it would seem
to be the same thing from one occasion of utterance to the
next, something like the sense of 'The day on which this ut-
terance is made is cold'.  But utterances of 'Today is cold'
cannot always have the same sense, for the simple reason
that different Thoughts can be expressed by different utter-
ances of this sentence, Thoughts which must be different, by
Frege's own lights, since one can coherently take different
attitudes towards them.3
I shall fill this argument out somewhat below.  But before
I do, it is important that we get clear about what a "Fregean"
view of demonstratives would be like, that is, what general
claims might be taken to characterize such a view.  This is
1I attempt to resolve some of these in "The Sense of Communication," Mind
104 (1995): 79-106.
2I shall allow myself to be a bit sloppy about this distinction, sometimes
using 'demonstrative' when I really mean 'demonstrative or indexical'.  Context
should resolve any resulting ambiguities.
3Roughly, this argument appears in John Perry, "Frege on Demonstratives,"
in The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993), pp. 3-32, at pp. 7-9.
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not just for the obvious reason that we cannot evaluate the
bearing arguments of the kind just mentioned have upon
such positions unless we know what "such positions" are; it
is also because I shall ultimately conclude that not all of
Frege's doctrines can be sustained.  It will therefore be im-
portant that we understand exactly which aspects of Frege's
view we are forced to abandon, so that we should be able to
see how central or peripheral they are.
Although there are many significant Fregean doctrines
about the notion of sense,4 five of them are of particular sig-
nificance here.  The first of these is:
(1) Thoughts are the contents of certain mental
states; in particular, they are the contents of
propositional attitudes.
As I understand it, this amounts to a definition: the basic no-
tion of sense, for Frege, is a psychological one.  (He would
not put it that way, though, since he tends to identify psy-
chology with the study of "ideas"—mental images and the
like.)  So thesis (1), by itself, makes no substantive claim: it
just tells us how the word 'Thought' is going to be used; it
involves no commitment about what Thoughts are.5  There
4See Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language (Cambridge MA:
Harvard University Press, 1973), Ch. 6, for a now classic discussion of Frege's
various doctrines concerning sense and reference, to which I am much indebted.
Also of great influence is Michael Dummett, "Frege's Distinction Between
Sense and Reference," in Truth and Other Enigmas (London: Duckworth, 1978),
pp. 116-44.
55Frege himself held that Thoughts were abstract entities, denizens of a
"third realm."  See "Thoughts," tr. P. Geach and R.H. Stoothoff, in Gottlob
Frege, Collected Papers, ed. B. McGuinness (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), pp.
351-72, at p. 363, orig. p. 69.  There is good reason, I believe, to think that
Frege's position is unstable at this point: See Michael Dummett, "Frege's Myth
of the Third Realm," in his Frege and Other Philosophers (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1991), pp. 249-62.  Frege's position, as I understand it, is not fundamen-
is, however, a subsidiary claim that gives thesis (1) a bit
more bite:6
(1a) There can be different Thoughts that "con-
cern the same object" and ascribe the same
property to it.  For example, the Thought that
Superman flies and the Thought that Clark
Kent flies are different, even though Super-
man is Clark Kent.
This is the familiar Fregean doctrine of the intensionality of
belief.  It is intended to follow from thesis (1) and the obser-
vation that a thinker could, say, believe, as Lois Lane seems
to believe, that Superman flies, without believing that Clark
flies, even though Clark is Superman.
I myself regard thesis (1a) as irrefutable, though not of
course unquestionable.7  The reason is not, I should empha-
                                                                                                              
tally committed to this Platonistic claim, however.  In many ways, it amounts to
an ontological reflection of the much more important claim that Thoughts are
shareable, that is, that any given thought can be entertained and believed by
anyone.  For discussion of the notion of shareability, see Alexander George,
"Has Dummett Over-salted His Frege?  Remarks on the Conveyability of
Thought," in R. Heck (ed.), Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honour of
Michael Dummett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 35-69.  Much has been
written on the tension between Frege's claim that Thoughts are shareable and his
insistence that self-conscious Thoughts are not shareable.  The tension will oc-
cupy us below.
6Another is the thesis that belief is conceptual, that the contents of attitudes
are composed of smaller pieces (intuitively, the senses of the sub-sentential
components of sentences that might express them).  We need not pursue this
matter here.  But I will speak, quite freely, of the senses of words (and of similar
parts of Thoughts), meaning by this, as Frege does, what the sub-sentential
components contribute to the senses of sentences in which they are contained.
7Let me emphasize that it does not stand opposed to views according to
which belief is a three-place relation, between a thinker, a proposition, and a
"way of apprehending" the proposition.  If one likes this kind of view, take a
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size, that I regard certain linguistic intuitions as incontest-
able (or as inexplicable, if [1a] is denied).  Rather, the reason
is that I think that our beliefs about objects are implicated in
the explanation of our behavior in ways with which the de-
nial of (1a) would be inconsistent.  For example, if John runs
in the direction of a particular person and gives her a huge
hug, that may be partly because he believes that the person
in question, that person, is Susan.  And it may well be that
the belief that that person was Sarah would not have caused
such behavior, even though Susan and Sarah are one and the
same (unbeknownst to John).
It is thus important to distinguish the doctrine about the
nature of belief stated in theses (1) and (1a) from parallel
doctrines, which Frege also holds, about the nature of belief-
attribution:8
(2) Thoughts are the references of that-clauses.
(2a) Sentences of the form 'N believes that a is F'
and 'N believes that b is F' can have different
truth-values, even if 'a' and 'b' refer to the
same object.
Theses (2) and (2a) are independent of theses (1) and (1a);
indeed, they are arguably independent of one another.9
                                                                                                              
"Thought," in my usage, to be an amalgamation of the proposition and a way of
apprehending it.  (I do think that this doctrine of belief is unfortunately stated,
however.  On examination, the "ways of apprehending propositions" turn out to
factor into ways of apprehending their parts.)
8This is what I regard as the correct way to state Frege's claim that sentences
in intensional contexts have "indirect reference," namely, their senses.
9Thesis (2a) purports to be a piece of data for semantic theory.  If accepted
as such, it constrains what one can take the references of that-clauses to be: if
(2a) holds, one cannot suppose 'that a is F' and 'that b is F' to have the same ref-
erence whenever 'a' and 'b' do, since the relation denoted by 'believes', whatever
More importantly, (2a) does not follow from (1a).  It is not
incoherent (though it might well be uncomfortable) to hold
that, although beliefs must be individuated more finely than
by the objects they concern—so that (1a) holds—still, belief-
attributing sentences of English effectively ignore such dif-
ferences, at least so far as their truth-conditions are con-
cerned.10  Nor does (2a) imply (1a): although, as I have said, I
don't think the view defensible, if one did think that the
contents of beliefs did not need to be individuated more
finely than in terms of the objects they concerned, thus de-
nying (1a), one could still hold that sentences attributing be-
liefs in English obey (2a), if, e.g., one thought that the se-
mantics of that-clauses was paratactic.11  Other options are
also possible.
In the present paper, I shall simply ignore these issues
about belief-attribution, since they do not appear to bear di-
rectly upon the issues I want to discuss.  On the other hand, I
will assume the correctness of (1a) throughout.  Skeptics
about (1a) should read the arguments here as conditioned by
its truth.
The following Fregean thesis has sometimes played an
                                                                                                              
it may be, cannot both hold and fail to hold between N and the referent of 'that a
is F', i.e., the referent of 'that b is F'.  But (2a) does not tell us what the refer-
ences of that-clauses are: it does not, in particular, imply that they are Thoughts;
all kinds of views are possible here.  Nor does (2) imply (2a).  If one thought
that that-clauses in general were "transparent" in the way that (2a) denies that
they are, then one would, I think, be compelled to deny (2), for then there could
be no semantic justification for distinguishing the denotations of that-clauses in
this way.  But "belief" could behave compatibly with the denial of (2a), although
some other verbs behaved in accord with analogues of (2a).
10David Braun holds just such a combination of views.  See his "Russel-
lianism and Psychological Generalizations," Nous 34 (2000): 203-36.
11See Donald Davidson, "On Saying That," in Inquiries Into Truth and In-
terpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 93-108, for an early version of
this view.
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important role in discussions of the issues with which I am
here concerned:
(3) Sense determines reference.
On the weakest interpretation of thesis (3),12 it speaks of
"determination" only in a mathematical sense: it claims only
that senses are related many-one to references.  Thus,
Thoughts are related many-one to truth-values, so if one
thinks the same Thought twice, what one thinks must have
the same truth-value both times; if one thinks of an object
twice "in the same way," one must be thinking of the same
object both times.  For present purposes, however, as far as I
can tell, this thesis is important only insofar as it gives addi-
tional content to thesis (1a): if two Thoughts have different
truth-values, then surely one can coherently take different
attitudes towards them, since it must be reasonable to be-
lieve the truth.
We come now to the theses which are of particular im-
port for the present discussion.  The first of these is:
(4) The sense of a sentence is what one grasps in
understanding it.
Thesis (4) is important, for us, because it begins to connect
the notion of sense to language.  Although it is not obvious
12Stronger interpretations of thesis (3) are possible.  Sense might be held to
determine reference in the much stronger sense that it should be possible to ex-
plain why a particular belief concerns the objects it does in terms of its having
the content it does.  In some relatively trivial way, that surely must be true: the
fact that the belief is about the objects it is about must have something to do
with its having the content it does.  But the intention behind this stronger inter-
pretation is that sense should be independent of and prior to reference, so that it
should be possible to give the sort of explanation demanded.  If so, that might
seem to require the notion of sense to be internalist.  These issues are very com-
plex.  Fortunately, we do not need to pursue them.
that we must do so, I think it best if we also treat it, for the
time being, as definitional:13 it tells us something about how
Frege understands the notion of the sense of a linguistic ex-
pression.  Frege clearly intends that an expression's having
the sense it does should be an objective matter; it is equally
clear that he intends understanding an expression to amount
to one's being aware that it has the sense it does.14  Thus, the-
sis (4) tells us that a sentence's having the sense it does is an
objective matter and that a speaker's recognizing the sen-
tence as having that sense constitutes her understanding it.
But just as thesis (1) is silent about the nature of Thoughts, so
thesis (4) does not tell us what the sense of a sentence (or
other expression) might be: for all that has been said so far,
the sense of a sentence might be a Russellian proposition.
To connect the notion of the sense of an expression, em-
ployed in thesis (4), with the notion of a Thought character-
ized by thesis (1), we need another thesis:
(5) The sense of a sentence is a Thought.
As many have pointed out, this thesis is not to be under-
stood as definitional: it is the substantive (indeed, bold)
claim that a notion which has its home in propositional-
attitude psychology is also fit to serve in the theory of lan-
13The issues I want to discuss concern the interaction of theses (4) and (5).
Treating (4) as in effect a definition allows us to keep one half of the equation
fixed.  However, I think there is something to be said for the claim that, insofar
as Frege distinguishes what we might call "cognitive sense"—the contents of
propositional attitudes—from "linguistic sense"—the meanings of sen-
tences—thesis (4) is what characterizes the latter.  I hope to address this inter-
pretive issue elsewhere.  See "The Sense of Communication," pp. 82-4, 86-90,
for some preliminary discussion.
14He writes: "The sense of a proper name is grasped by everybody who is
sufficiently familiar with the language ... to which it belongs... ." See Gottlob
Frege, "On Sense and Reference," tr. M. Black, in Collected Papers, pp. 157-77,
at p. 158, orig. p. 27.
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guage—that the sense, or meaning, of a sentence is the very
same kind of thing that is fit to be the content of a belief.
Bold or otherwise, though, the thesis has great intuitive
plausibility: Frege's idea is, ultimately, just that the sense of a
sentence is the content of the belief one would express by
uttering that sentence assertorically.  Or, again, the sense of a
sentence is the content of the belief one who understood it
would come to have were she to accept that sentence as
true.15
Theses (4) and (5) are so far unclear, in two important re-
spects.
First, it is unclear what Frege means by saying that un-
derstanding involves "grasping" a sense.  Typically, when
Frege talks of grasping a Thought, he means something like
entertaining that Thought—thinking it, though not (neces-
sarily) judging it as true or false.  So part of Frege's point is
that understanding a sentence involves entertaining a certain
Thought, namely, the one that is the sense of the sentence in
question.  But why does one have to "entertain" a Thought to
understand an utterance?  It is difficult to be sure what Frege
thinks about the matter, but I think we can best make sense
of his position if we take him to be trading upon the intuitive
equivalence of 'understanding' and 'knowing the meaning'.
On this interpretation, Frege is saying that, when one under-
stands an utterance, one knows what it means: one knows,
in particular, that it means that p, for appropriate p; and, ob-
viously, in thinking that an utterance means that p, one must
grasp, or entertain, the Thought that p.  To put the point less
technically: Frege's idea is that, to understand a sentence,
one must know what belief it can be used to express (or
communicate); in knowing such a thing, one grasps the
Thought that is the content of that belief.
15Those wanting to ask whether these explanations are compatible are asked
to wait a bit.
Second, there is an unfortunate ambiguity in theses (4)
and (5), as Frege usually states them, one that has been re-
sponsible for a great deal of confusion: he leaves it unclear
whether the theses concern sentences as types or particular
utterances of sentences.16  Most of his explicit pronounce-
ments tend to incline towards the former reading.  In most of
his discussions of the notion of sense, however, Frege is ab-
stracting from context-dependence; most of the time, there is
no need for him to distinguish between sentences and utter-
ances of them, and so no need for him to clarify the theses in
the way I am demanding.  However, once context-depen-
dence comes into consideration, disambiguation is required.
And it should be clear that theses (4) and (5) are jointly plau-
sible only if they are construed as concerning utterances of
sentences, for the simple reason, already noted above, that
different Thoughts can be expressed on different occasions
by utterances of one and the same sentence.
So I take it that theses (4) and (5) may be restated as fol-
lows:17
16There is disagreement about what the basic notion should be taken to be
here: an utterance, or a sentence relative to a context, or what have you.  These
issues should not affect our discussion, so I shall continue to speak of utterances,
as that seems most convenient.
17Frege did so understand these claims.  At "Thoughts," p. 358, op. 64, he
writes that, when context matters, "... the mere wording, as it can be preserved in
writing, is not the complete expression of the thought; a knowledge of certain
conditions accompanying the utterance, which are used as means of expressing
the thought, is needed for us to grasp the thought correctly.  Pointing the finger,
hand gestures, glances, may belong here, too".  Note that Frege insists that con-
textual features are part of the expression of the Thought—part, as it were, of the
sentence—not that they help fix the reference of a single Thought always ex-
pressed by an utterance of the sentence.  For further discussion of this matter,
see Tyler Burge, "Sinning Against Frege," Philosophical Review 88
(1979): 398-432, and "Frege on Sense and Linguistic Meaning," in D. Bell and
N. Cooper (eds.), The Analytic Tradition: Meaning, Thought and Knowledge
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), pp. 30-60.
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(4*) The sense of an utterance of a given sentence
is what one grasps in understanding that ut-
terance.
(5*) The sense expressed by an utterance of a
given sentence is a Thought.
And again, if we think of understanding an utterance as
knowing its meaning, we can combine these theses into the
following: To understand an utterance is to know what
Thought its utterer thereby expresses or, again, what
Thought one who understood it would thereby come to be-
lieve were she to accept the utterance as true.18
As I am understanding the notion of sense, then, there is
no obvious connection between it and the notion of "linguis-
tic" or "standing" meaning: there is, that is to say, no pre-
sumption that the sense of an utterance should be identical
with the fixed, context-independent meaning of the sentence
of which it is an utterance.  I shall say more about this matter
in section 3.
I hope that this explanation of theses (4) and (5) has made
them seem plausible (or at least well-motivated).  In a sense,
the theses simply tell us that what we say—the content of an
assertion—is what we believe—the content of the belief we
thereby express.  That, I take it, is both natural and attrac-
tive.  But it is important that we should have a more refined
appreciation of what lies behind the theses.  There is little in
Frege's writings to help us here, but there is some indication
that what moves him is a certain conception of the nature of
communication, one so natural that we might call it the Na-
ïve Conception of Communication.  This conception is worth
making explicit.
18Those still wanting to ask whether these explanations are compatible are
asked to wait a bit longer.
What is the purpose of communication?  At a minimum,
it would seem, part of its purpose is to transfer information
from one speaker to another: I have a belief, or take myself
to know something, and I want to get you to believe the
same thing.19  Perhaps I know that the friend for whom you
are looking has gone out for the day, and I want that you
should know that, too.  So I utter some words.  I say, "John
has gone fishing," and then you too believe that John has
gone fishing and end your search.  How does that happen?
How is it that my uttering these words leads to your having
this belief?  Presumably, you come to have that belief, in
part, because you recognize it as the one I was expressing.
But how do you do that?  What, that is to say, is the relation
between the words I utter, the belief I express, and the belief
you acquire?  It is because my words mean something that
you recognize me as expressing the belief I was; it is because
my words mean what they do, and because you recognize
them as meaning what they do, that you form the belief you
do.  But what could my words mean that your recognizing
me as having uttered words with that meaning should
amount to your recognizing me as expressing the very belief
you then acquire?  The most obvious answer is that what my
words mean is precisely what I already believe and you
come to believe: when you grasp the content of my assertion,
you thereby grasp the very Thought I believe and am trying
to communicate to you.
This is the Naïve Conception of Communication.  Ac-
cording to it, when I communicate, I am trying to bring it
about that someone else should come (to have the opportu-
nity) to share a belief with me: I do so by uttering a sentence
whose content, on that occasion, is the same as that of the
19Of course, not all communication has this kind of purpose: sometimes, I
want to get you to do something, so I utter a sentence like 'Please shut the door'.
But I shall concentrate on the case of assertion, as is common.
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belief I am trying to communicate; it is because my ad-
dressee, being a competent speaker of my language, recog-
nizes the content of my belief in my words that she can come
to believe what I do.  That is to say, in the example above,
what my addressee needs to know about my utterance, if
she is to understand it, is that it means that John has gone
fishing; and that John has gone fishing is precisely what I
believe and am attempting to communicate.  So the sense
expressed by my utterance is a Thought, something that can
be (and in this case is) the content of a belief.
There is evidence that Frege held such a view of commu-
nication.20  But  I shall not pursue this interpretive issue here;
for I should not want to say that Frege was attracted to the
Naïve Conception because of any specific theoretical com-
mitments he had.  On the contrary, he was attracted to it
simply because it is so natural: when he started to think
about communication, the Naïve Conception was just what
came immediately to mind.  Indeed, the best reason for at-
tributing the Naïve Conception to Frege is just that it helps
us to make good sense of thesis (5)—via the reflections just
rehearsed—and so helps us understand Frege's claim that
proper names have not just reference but also sense.
Consider again the example just discussed.  And now
suppose that we both know of John, not just as John, but also
as Jack, but are ignorant of the fact that John and Jack are
one and the same.  If so, then we must ask, not just why you
form the belief that John has gone fishing when I utter the
words 'John has gone fishing', but also why you do not form
the belief that Jack has gone fishing.21  Frege's suggestion is
20It is, for example, active in Frege's various arguments against the claim
that Thoughts are ideas.  See, e.g., "On Sense and Reference," pp. 159-61,
opp. 27-30, and "Thoughts," pp. 361-3, opp. 68-9.
21Of course, I am here assuming that these might be different beliefs: I am
appealing, that is, to thesis (1a).  Note that the question is really why one is (or
just this: My utterance of 'John has gone fishing' has, as its
sense, the Thought that John has gone fishing; your recog-
nizing it as having that sense partly explains your forming
the belief you do.  Had I instead uttered 'Jack has gone fish-
ing', that utterance would have had a different
sense—namely, that Jack has gone fishing—and your recog-
nizing it as having that sense would then have explained
your forming the belief that Jack had gone fishing.  These
two sentences must therefore differ as regards the senses
(that is, the meanings) competent speakers recognize utter-
ances of them as having: if they had the very same meaning,
it would be hard to explain why one should form the belief
that John has gone fishing when the former is asserted, but
form the belief that Jack has gone fishing when the latter is.
The argument for thesis (5) is thus a "how else" argument
driven by the Naïve Conception of Communication.  How,
except in terms of a difference of meaning, can we explain
why speakers may justifiably form the belief that John has
gone fishing when told "John has gone fishing," but not
when told "Jack has gone fishing"?  Note that I did not say
"even if John is Jack," for the crucial question here—Frege's
question, if you will—is independent of whether John is
Jack: it arises both if he is and if he is not.  If we consider the
case of John and Hilary, who are different, then the obvious
and, so far as I can tell, universally accepted answer to
Frege's question—as one might expect from the "even
if"—begins with the claim that the sentences 'John has gone
fishing' and 'Hilary has gone fishing' have different mean-
ings: it is because they have different meanings that speakers
may justifiably form the belief that John has gone fishing
                                                                                                              
regards oneself as being) justified in forming these beliefs, not why one forms
them, in a purely causal sense.
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only in reaction to an utterance of the former.22  To avoid a
commitment to thesis (5), then, one would have to hold that
some other explanation is to be given if John is Jack: in such
cases, that is to say, the reason why one may justifiably form
the belief that John has gone fishing only when told "John
has gone fishing," but not when told "Jack has gone fishing,"
must be, not that the sentences have different meanings, but
something else.  That, however, seems uncomfortable: we
seem to be giving different explanations in cases that are
relevantly similar.  Moreover, actual speakers are not always
sensitive to the difference between the cases; indeed, they
are insensitive to it in precisely the cases that are of most in-
terest, namely, cases in which they do not know that John is
Jack.
It therefore seems to me that the Naïve Conception of
Communication, together with theses (1a) and (4), essen-
tially implies thesis (5); and hence that referring expressions
have not just reference but also sense.  I will, however, be
arguing that the Naïve Conception of Communication is in-
defensible, at least in the presence of thesis (1a).23  Specifi-
cally, I shall argue, in section 4, that communication is not
always designed to get one's addressee to share one's be-
lief—that is, to get one's interlocutor to hold the very same
belief one has oneself.  If not, the defense of thesis (5) fails
and, as we shall see, thesis (5) fails as well.  I shall then at-
tempt to determine just how significant a concession the
abandonment of thesis (5) is—whether, in particular, we
should conclude, as a result, that the meaning of a demon-
strative is just the object it denotes.  My conclusion will be
22Given appropriate background beliefs, of course, one could justifiably
form any belief in reaction to the utterance of any sentence.  What is at issue
here, however, is of course the belief one forms in the first instance, so to speak.
23Bob Stalnaker once suggested to me that the right resolution of the conflict
would be to abandon thesis (1a) and retain thesis (5).  I will be exploring the al-
ternative, since I find thesis (1a) hard to give up.
that we should not so conclude.  But I shall have to explain
my suggested alternative view later.
2. Demonstrative Thoughts
With this background in place, we can now begin our dis-
cussion of demonstrative and indexical expressions.  Con-
sider the demonstrative 'that'.  Suppose that I say "That man
is a philosopher," demonstrating David Kaplan—and then
again demonstrating Bill Clinton.24  Then it is clear that the
Thoughts I express by means of these two utterances are dif-
ferent: that follows from thesis (3), since the truth-values of
the Thoughts thus expressed are different.  But one does not
need to invoke thesis (3) to get this conclusion.  I might just
as well have said "That man is a great author," demonstrat-
ing (someone known to me as) George Orwell, and again
demonstrating (someone known to me as) Eric Blair.  The
truth-values of the Thoughts I thereby express are the same,
since George Orwell and Eric Blair are the same person.  But
if I do not know that they are the same person, I might well
take different attitudes towards the Thoughts thus ex-
pressed.  Since Thoughts are individuated in terms of cogni-
tive significance, these Thoughts must be different.
If demonstratives are to have senses, then, and if the
sense of an utterance is to be the Thought it is used to ex-
press, these two utterances of 'That man is a great author'
must have different senses.  Is that a problem?  It would be if
one thought that the sense of an utterance was the context-
independent standing meaning of the sentence uttered: since
the very same sentence has been uttered in the two cases, the
two utterances would have to have the same sense.  I have
24Jeffrey King has recently argued that complex demonstratives, at least,
such as 'that man', are not referring expressions but quantifiers.  See his Complex
Demonstratives (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2002).  I find King's arguments
ingenious but ultimately unconvincing, for reasons I cannot discuss here.
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already warned against identifying the sense of an utterance
with the standing meaning of the sentence uttered.  But even
if I had not done so, the obvious thing to say about this sort
of example would be that, just as the reference of an utter-
ance of a demonstrative is partly determined by the context,
so is its sense.25
To rest with this response is to miss a large part of the
point, however.  As John Perry has argued, demonstratives
and (some) other indexicals are essentially indexical.26  The
point is most familiar from the case of 'I'.  If I utter the sen-
tence 'I am a philosopher', then I thereby give voice to my
self-conscious knowledge that I am a philosopher.  Perry ar-
gues convincingly that no purely descriptive Thought could
serve this purpose, and it is no good responding that having
a sense need not require being synonymous with a descrip-
tion.27  The real question, he insists, is: Given that the sense
expressed by an utterance of 'I' is partly determined by con-
text, is any additional contribution from context required to
determine its reference?  Does the fact that the Thought I ex-
press is about me depend upon the context in which the
Thought is being entertained, or does it not?  If it does
not—if sense determines reference independently of con-
text—then if someone else were to think that very same
Thought, she would thereby think that I, Richard Heck, am a
philosopher.  But then that Thought could not be the content
of my self-conscious knowledge that I am a philosopher; it
could only be the content of a piece of third-person knowl-
25See John McDowell, "De Re Senses," Philosophical Quarterly 34
(1984): 283-294, at pp. 287ff., for one version of this response.
26See, e.g., John Perry, "The Problem of the Essential Indexical," in The
Problem of the Essential Indexical, pp. 33-52.  Philosophical lore traces this sort
of concern, in contemporary philosophy, to Hector Neri-Castañeda, "'He': A
Study in the Logic of Self-consciousness," Ratio 8 (1966): 130-57.
27See Perry, "Frege on Demonstratives," p. 15, fn. 4, which was added in the
reprint.
edge that someone else (or, indeed, I) might have about me.28
If, on the other hand, the Thought is about me only because I
am thinking it—if sense determines reference only with the
help of context—then, if someone else were to think it, it
would presumably be about her, whence by thinking this
Thought she would think the self-conscious Thought that
she is a philosopher.  But then thesis (3) fails.
The point applies as well to demonstratives.  The
Thought I express when I say "That woman is Shirley Tem-
ple" may express my recognition that the person before me is
indeed Shirley Temple; and it may well be because I have
such a demonstrative Thought that I then act in certain ways
(say, I ask her for an autograph).  But now is the fact that the
Thought I thus express is about Shirley Temple independent
of the context in which I entertain it or is it not?  If it is, then,
were I to entertain the same Thought in some other context,
it would still express something about Shirley Temple;
whatever that might be, the Thought could not then embody
my recognition of a person as Shirley Temple; it could not
have the sort of connection with action that my "Thought of
recognition" has.  But if some additional contribution from
context is needed for reference to be fixed, the Thought is
one I could have in some different context—say, one in
which I was standing before Jane Fonda—and then it would
be about her, Jane Fonda, to the effect that she was Shirley
Temple, a Thought which would be false.  So again, thesis
(3) would fail.
These examples do not just show us something about
certain sorts of sentences; most fundamentally, the examples
show us something about certain sorts of Thoughts, that
28To put this point differently, there seems to be no one Thought that you
can entertain that is plausibly identified with the Thought I entertain when I
think self-consciously that I am a philosopher.
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they are, as one might put it, essentially context-bound.29
Self-conscious Thoughts and Thoughts of recognition are
Thoughts one can entertain only if one is in an appropriate
context, i.e., suitably placed with respect to one's environ-
ment.  The self-conscious Thought that I am a philosopher is
one that only I can entertain: at least, it is the self-conscious
Thought that I am a philosopher only when I entertain it.
Similarly, the Thought I have when I think that that woman
is Shirley Temple is one I can have only when I am in the
right sort of perceptual relation with Shirley Temple: at least,
it is a Thought that embodies my recognition that that
woman is Shirley Temple, rather than my putative recogni-
tion that some other woman is, only because I am in that sort
of perceptual state.
One option, then, would be to say that the referential
properties of demonstrative and indexical Thoughts are de-
termined only given some additional contribution from
context—and so to reject thesis (3), and so thesis (1a) as
well.30
 O n th i s vi e w , th e T h o u g h t I e n t e r t a i n w h e n I th i n k 
s e l f - consciously that I am a philosopher is one that you
could also entertain—though when you did so, you would
think self-consciously that you are a philosopher.  If that
seems unpalatable, it can be made less so.  Rather than iden-
tify the contents of Thoughts with something that is inde-
pendent of the contexts in which they are entertained, one
can identify them with a kind of amalgamation of a
"Thought," in that sense, and the object that context deter-
mines as its reference. So when I think that I am a philoso-
pher, what I think is a Thought that might be represented as:
29For this terminology, and related arguments, see Burge, "Sinning Against
Frege," p. 430.
30This is Perry's response.  It is also urged by Burge.  See "Sinning Against
Frege," pp. 429-30, and his "Belief De Re," Journal of Philosophy 74
(1977): 338-62.
<<self-conscious way of thinking of an object,
RH>, philosopher-hood>.
And when Bill Clinton thinks, self-consciously, that he is a
philosopher, he thinks a Thought that might be represented
as:
<<self-conscious way of thinking of an object,
BC>, philosopher-hood>.
Similarly, the sense corresponding to 'I' is given, not just by
the self-conscious way of thinking of an object, but by it to-
gether with its reference—in my case, by:
<self-conscious way of thinking of an object,
RH>.
Some inclined to defend a broadly Fregean view about
these matters—Evans, for example—have rejected this sort
of "two factor" view in favor of so-called "object-dependent
thoughts."31  I myself favor this strategy, but we need not
pursue this issue here.  The two views agree that demon-
strative and indexical Thoughts are context-bound, at least
in the weak sense that someone can entertain the Thought
that that woman is Shirley Temple, or the self-conscious
Thought that I, Richard Heck, am a philosopher, only if
suitably placed with respect to the objects of these Thoughts.
They agree, that is to say, that one's placement in one's envi-
ronment can affect the contents of the Thoughts one is capa-
ble of entertaining.
This weak claim—that one's placement in one's environ-
ment can affect the contents of the Thoughts one is capable
of entertaining—is all I need here.  It does not matter, for my
31See Gareth Evans, Varieties of Reference (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1982), section 6.4.
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present purposes, whether that is because the two-factor
theory is correct (the second factor being determined by
context) or because something like Evans's view is correct.
As we shall see momentarily, however, the two-factor view
suggests a familiar conception of the senses of demonstrative
and indexical utterances that we need to abandon.
3. Understanding Demonstrative Utterances
I warned earlier against conflating the sense of an uttered
sentence with the fixed, context-independent meaning of
that sentence, what Kaplan calls character, Perry calls role,
and I shall call standing meaning.  But there is a very natural
route to some version of that identification, and it is often
invoked by those attempting to defend at least the spirit of
Frege's view.  Indeed, Frege himself is sometimes said to be
committed to such an identification.
The sense of my utterance of 'I am a philosopher' and
that of Clinton's utterance of the same sentence must obvi-
ously differ: what is said by means of such utterances, their
senses, must therefore depend somehow upon context.  But
suppose we now agree with Perry, who suggests, and not
without plausibility, that what a referring expression—for
example, 'I'—contributes to what is said by utterances con-
taining it is limited to (i) its standing meaning—roughly,
that of the description 'the utterer'—and (ii) its referent—as
determined by context on that occasion of use.  If so, the
sense of my utterance of 'I am a philosopher' might be taken
to be something like:
<<standing meaning of 'I', RH>, philosopher-
hood>.
This kind of maneuver promises, moreover, to preserve the-
sis (5).  The belief I express by means of this utterance is, on
the two-factor view, something like:
<<self-conscious way of thinking of an object,
RH>, philosopher-hood>.
So if we identify the self-conscious way of thinking of an
object with the standing meaning of 'I', then we will have se-
cured Frege's claim that the sense expressed by an utterance
is a Thought.
There are a number of problems with this line of argu-
ment.  First of all, demonstrative and indexical beliefs can-
not, in general, be construed along the lines just suggested.
The idea here is that the "way of thinking of an object" that
figures in the content of a belief should be identified with the
standing meaning of an appropriate demonstrative or in-
dexical expression, namely, the one that might be used in
expressing that belief: 'I', in the case of self-conscious beliefs;
'here', in the case of self-locating beliefs; and 'that', in the
case of demonstrative beliefs.  Although this is not implausi-
ble in the cases of 'I' and 'here', the strategy does not gener-
alize.  Consider the following example, due to Perry.32
Imagine that one is standing behind a large building,
seeing the bow and stern of a ship on either side of it.  As it
happens, the bow and stern are parts of one very large ship,
Enterprise.  One may well find oneself believing "That ship"
(mentally "pointing" to the bow) "is an aircraft carrier" while
not believing "That ship" (mentally "pointing" to the stern)
"is an aircraft carrier."  Plainly, if Thoughts are individuated
by considerations of cognitive significance, then these
Thoughts are different.  So they cannot both be characterized
as:
<<standing meaning of 'that', Enterprise>, air-
craft-carrier–hood>.
32Perry, "Frege on Demonstratives," pp. 12-13.
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One must be thinking of Enterprise in different ways when
one entertains these two Thoughts: since the standing
meaning of the demonstrative does not vary from context to
context, demonstrative ways of thinking of objects cannot be
identified with the standing meaning of 'that'.
There are ways out here.33  For example, one could try in-
corporating the demonstration itself into the content.  I don't
myself think that this is an adequate response, but let us set
this matter aside, for there is a more serious problem.  Con-
sider the indexical 'you'.  As a matter of its standing mean-
ing, an utterance of 'you' refers to the person addressed in
that utterance.  But in the sense that there is such a thing as a
self-conscious, first-person belief, there is no such thing as a
second-person belief, or so it seems to me.  Of course, I can
identify someone descriptively, as the person to whom I am
now speaking, and may have beliefs whose contents involve
that descriptive identification.  But that is not what I mean to
deny: I mean to deny that there is any such thing as an es-
sentially indexical second-person belief.  The phenomenon
of the second-person is a linguistic one, bound up with the
fact that utterances, as we make them, are typically directed
to people, not just made to the cosmos.  (If there were speak-
ers of a language who never directed their utterances to their
fellows, they would have no use for the second-person.)  The
word 'you' has no correlate at the level of thought: if not,
then the contents of the beliefs we express using the word
'you' have very little to do with its standing meaning.
I don't really know how to argue for this claim: it just
seems right to me, even obviously so.  But if it is right, two
things follow.  First, the attempt to defend thesis (5) by
identifying the sense of an utterance of a demonstrative or
indexical expression with its standing meaning plus refer-
33For discussion of such examples, see David Braun, "Demonstratives and
Their Linguistic Meanings," Noûs 30 (1996): 145-73.
ence fails.  The case of 'you' shows that the standing mean-
ing of an expression and the contents of beliefs one expresses
using it come sharply apart: the contents of the beliefs that
are typically expressed using a given expression might have
hardly anything to do with that expression's standing
meaning.  This conclusion threatens thesis (5): if the content
of the belief that is expressed by an utterance of an indexical
sentence in no way "involves" its standing meaning, then, if
the content of the utterance itself does "involve" its standing
meaning, we have conclusive reason to reject thesis (5).  So,
if we are to defend thesis (5)—if we are to defend Frege's
identification of what is said with a Thought—we must deny
that what is said by an utterance of, say, 'You are a philoso-
pher' involves its standing meaning, as the identification of
ways of thinking with standing meaning would have it. The
sense of an utterance of 'You are a philosopher' cannot be
anything like "The addressee is a philosopher."
Kaplan, of course, has familiarized us with one way of
denying that standing meaning is any part of what is said.34
On his account, standing meaning is a determinant of what is
said but is no part of what is said: character, as he puts it,
determines but is no part of content.  I have argued, on
grounds different from his, that Fregeans must accept this
component of Kaplan's view.  Now, Kaplan of course claims
further that demonstratives and indexicals are directly refer-
ential, that such expressions contribute only their referents
to what is expressed by utterances of sentences containing
them: such utterances express "singular propositions."  If so,
since, in the example I borrowed from Perry, the two utter-
ances of the sentence 'That ship is an aircraft carrier' express
34See David Kaplan, "Dthat," in P. Cole (ed.), Pragmatics (New York: Aca-
demic Publishers, 1978), pp. 221-43, and "Demonstratives: An Essay on the
Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives," in
J.Almog, J.Perry, and H.Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan (New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 1989), pp. 565-614.
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the same singular proposition, they have the same content,
and thesis (5) fails in dramatic fashion.
If what a referring expression contributes to determining
what is said by utterances of a sentence containing it is lim-
ited to its standing meaning and its referent, on that occasion
of use, there is of course no alternative to Kaplan's position.
Any attempt to defend a Fregean alternative must therefore
begin by developing a conception of how such an expression
might contribute something else to what is said.  Let me then
sketch a view whose commitment to the thesis that demon-
stratives are directly referential is open to debate, but which
still allows us to respect Kaplan's central insights, namely:
(a) Standing meaning, together with context,
determines what is said, so that
(b) what is said by means of utterances contain-
ing demonstratives and indexicals may vary
with context, even though
(c) standing meaning is no part of what is said.
Once this view is in place, we can return to the question
whether demonstratives are directly referential.  Developing
the view amounts to "reconstructing the literature," as it is
sometimes put: I need to show that it is possible to draw the
important distinctions one needs to draw here in terms other
than those used by Kaplan.  Much of what follows will
therefore be familiar in outline but novel in detail: where
Kaplan employs the framework of possible worlds semantics
(in which there is little room for something besides character
and content), I will employ notions drawn from a general
theory of communication.  Additional novelty lies in the fact
that my argument for (c)—my argument that character is no
part of content—will, unlike other arguments known to me,
make no reference to modal, epistemic, or intensional op-
erators of any kind.
I suggested earlier that, for Frege, understanding an ut-
terance amounts to "grasping" its sense as the sense of that
utterance—to knowing that the utterance has the sense that
it does.  And Frege is clear that the sense of an utterance is
its truth-condition.35
So we may take the meaning of an utterance is to be
given by means of an appropriate statement of the form:
(6) Utterance U, of sentence S, is true if, and only
if, p.
If the meanings of utterances of S do not vary with context,
this will reduce to a T-sentence of the familiar form:
(7) S is true iff p.
But if the meanings of utterances of S do vary with context,
we need to record how they vary.  We may do so by intro-
ducing contextual variables into the antecedent of a condi-
tional that has something of the form (6) as consequent:36
(8) If U is an utterance of S, made in context C,
then U is true iff φ(C).
35See Gottlob Frege, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (Hildesheim: Georg Olms
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1966), vol. I, sec. 32.  The relevant portion of Grundge-
setze is translated as The Basic Laws of Arithmetic: Exposition of the System, tr.
M. Furth (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964).
36Such "conditional T-sentences" first appear in Tyler Burge, "Demonstra-
tive Constructions, Reference, and Truth," Journal of Philosophy 71
(1974): 205-23.  For a more general discussion of their import, see James Hig-
ginbotham, "Contexts, Models, and Meanings," in R. Kempson (ed.), Mental
Representations: The Interface Between Language and Reality (NY: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), pp. 29-48.
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Instances of schema (8) will thus characterize how the
meanings of utterances of S depend upon context.  That de-
pendence is captured by 'φ(C)'.  The meaning of a particu-
lar utterance of S will then be given by a T-sentence for that
utterance, namely, the T-sentence delivered by the relevant
instance of schema (8) and the contextual facts.
In particular applications, reference to contexts may be
replaced by reference to those features of the context which
are relevant in specific cases.  Thus, in the case of 'you', we
might have:
(9) If U is an utterance of 'You are F', and if x is
the addressee of U, then U is true iff x is F.
Similarly for 'that':
(10) If U is an utterance of 'That is F', and if x is
the demonstratum in U, then U is true iff x is
F.
Of course, an actual semantic theory would not contain axi-
oms concerning arbitrary sentences of the forms 'You are F'
and 'That is F' but would contain axioms stating how the ref-
erents of 'you' and 'that' are determined by context; one can
expect other complications, too.37  But this should do for
now.
It should be clear why this treatment satisfies conditions
37Of course, more than one demonstrative 'that' may occur in a given sen-
tence, so the actual clause for 'that' would have to take notice of this.  A similar
problem can arise even with 'you'.  Consider "You may be smart, but you are
even smarter," where one speaks first to one person and then to another.
I shall not directly address the difficult question what it is for an object to be
the demonstratum in a given context, though I shall discuss a related issue be-
low.  I do not think that we need to resolve that issue in order to answer the
questions I am discussing here.
(a) and (b), above.  Clauses like (9) and (10) capture standing
meaning's role as a determinant of what is said, so (a) is sat-
isfied; the T-sentence delivered by standing meaning and
context will obviously vary with context, so (b) is satisfied.
What of condition (c)?  A large part of the point of the
proposal is to remove standing meaning from what is said.
On this view, understanding an utterance U is knowing its
truth-condition, that is, knowing something of the form (6).
To understand an utterance of a sentence containing a de-
monstrative or indexical, therefore, it cannot suffice that one
know something of the form (8), that is, that one know the
standing meaning of the sentence: one must know what the
values of the contextual variables are, so that one can dis-
charge the antecedent and thereby arrive at some piece of
knowledge of the form (6).  If someone says "You are a phi-
losopher," one does not understand the utterance if one
knows only that, if x is the person addressed, the utterance is
true iff x is a philosopher; one must know who was ad-
dressed in order that one might advance from knowledge of
the sentence's standing meaning to knowledge of the mean-
ing of this specific utterance of it.  If I know that that person
is the addressee, then I will know that the utterance is true
iff that person is a philosopher: nothing about addressees
now appears in this statement of the meaning (that is, the
truth-condition) of the utterance; the standing meaning of
'you' is no part of what is said by means of this utterance.
Not just any knowledge one might have of the form (6)
will suffice for understanding, however.  Suppose someone
says "You are a philosopher," speaking to someone I take
myself to recognize as Bill Clinton.  Did the speaker say that
Bill Clinton is a philosopher?  The speaker may not know
that she is speaking to Bill Clinton.  Moreover, my under-
standing of this utterance can survive my coming to doubt
that Bill Clinton is indeed the addressee, so long as I still
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know that that person (the one I took myself to recognize as
Bill Clinton) is the addressee.  My knowledge that Bill
Clinton is the addressee thus seems to rest upon two other
pieces of knowledge: that that person is the addressee, and
that that person is Bill Clinton.  It is the former piece of
knowledge that (partially) constitutes my understanding the
utterance.  In general, insofar as knowledge of something of
the form (6) constitutes understanding, it is, so to speak, only
unmediated knowledge of something of that form that will do
so.38
Hence, one will understand an utterance of 'You are a
philosopher' just in case one thinks something like "That
person is a philosopher; that's what the speaker is saying."39
But should we deny that someone who knows only
something of the form (9)—someone who knows only the
standing meaning of the sentence that was ut-
tered—understands the utterance?  Must one know who was
addressed to understand an utterance of 'You are a philoso-
38The identification of the addressee upon which understanding rests must
be, in the words Peacocke uses for a slightly different purpose, "identification-
free."  See Christopher Peacocke, Sense and Content (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1983), pp. 139ff.
There are some odd cases about which I do not quite know what to say.
Suppose, for example, that someone says "You are a philosopher," and that I do
not myself see who has been addressed but am told that it was Bill Clinton.
Then I may well know that Bill Clinton was the addressee, and my knowledge
that he was does not rest upon any other identification I have made.  Still, how-
ever, it seems wrong to say that what was said was that Bill Clinton is a philoso-
pher or that I so understand it.  Note however that my identification of the ad-
dressee plausibly does rest upon some other identification, although it is not one
I have made: so we can still say that I do not understand the utterance; my
knowledge could not survive my informant's coming to doubt that it was Bill
Clinton who was addressed (though his understanding of it could).
39To put the point differently: 'You', on this view, acts as if it were a special
kind of demonstrative, one that always refers to the addressee.  So if you want
an analysis of 'you', try "That person to whom I am speaking."
pher'?  It would be very easy to dismiss this issue as merely
verbal.  Certainly, someone who knows the standing mean-
ing of the utterance knows something about it that a mono-
lingual speaker of Chinese would not be in a position to
know: in that sense, an English speaker would understand,
and our Chinese speaker would not.  All sides to the dispute
must accept that much.  So why should we reserve the word
'understanding' for the case in which one knows more than
just the standing meaning of the uttered sentence?
This is a fair question, but it is one that can be answered.
What is important here is not the word 'understanding' but
the theoretical work that word is doing.  The notion of un-
derstanding entered this discussion, in the first place, be-
cause it is mentioned in thesis (4), that the sense of an ex-
pression is what is grasped by those who understand it; it
appeared again in the explanation I tried to give of thesis (5),
that the sense of a sentence is a Thought.  As we saw, theses
(4) and (5) concern the sense expressed by a particular utter-
ance of a sentence; they do not concern the standing mean-
ing common to all utterances of that sentence.  Insofar as a
(not the) notion of understanding is used in explaining these
theses, it has to be the more refined one, according to which
what is involved in understanding a particular utterance of a
given sentence may differ from what is involved in under-
standing another utterance of that sentence.  To that extent,
then, we can simply stipulate, for the purposes of the present
discussion, that it is the more refined notion of understand-
ing that is relevant.
In fact, however, I think there is something substantive to
be said on behalf of the claim that one does not understand
an utterance of a sentence containing a demonstrative or in-
dexical expression if one knows only its standing meaning.
As I said, I do not wish to quarrel over the word.  But it does
seem to be important that the way I am proposing to use it
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be theoretically well-motivated; if it is not, theses (4) and (5)
will seem peculiarly unmotivated or misstated.  Essentially, I
want to suggest that we should use the word 'understand-
ing' in such a way that someone has understood an utterance
when and only when certain very basic goals of linguistic
communication have been achieved.  On this proposal, to
say that someone has understood is to say that, in some fun-
damental way, a particular communicative exchange has
been successful.  Of course, this explanation is program-
matic: if it is to be made less so, something has to be said
about what these "basic goals of communication" are sup-
posed to be.  Different conceptions of the nature of commu-
nication will then lead to different views about "under-
standing."  As I suggested earlier, however, thesis (5) itself
rests upon certain natural ideas about the nature of commu-
nication, enshrined in the Naïve Conception.  So it is at this
point that we need to invoke certain of the ideas that inform
that Conception.
As I said above, one of the basic purposes of communi-
cation is to make the transfer of information from one
speaker to another possible.  If that is right, one will have
understood only when one has, so to speak, put oneself in a
position to acquire information from the speaker (whether
one chooses to do so is another matter).  If one knows about
a particular utterance of 'You are a philosopher' only what
one would know about any such utterance, one is not in a
position to acquire the particular belief (that is, the particular
de re belief) the speaker means to be expressing.  So knowl-
edge of the standing meaning of the sentence uttered does
not make the transfer of information possible: knowing only
the standing meaning of the sentence does not guarantee
that this basic goal of communication will have been
achieved.  If so, one does not, simply by knowing the stand-
ing meaning of the sentence uttered, understand the utter-
ance.
It is not just that one is in no position to acquire the belief
the speaker is expressing, to gather information from her; if
one does not know who the speaker said was a philosopher,
one cannot evaluate, contradict, or endorse the claim, either;
more generally, one is in no position at all to engage the
speaker rationally.  There is a case to be made, I think, though
I shall not make it here, that we should conceive of the goals
of communication in this more general way:40  Communica-
tion does serve to make the transfer of information from
speaker to speaker possible, but, more fundamentally, it
serves to make it possible for people to engage one another
rationally; it makes it possible for thinkers to bring their be-
liefs to bear upon the cognitive lives of others and to allow
their own cognitive lives to be influenced by those of oth-
ers.41  If that is right, and if 'understanding' is used as I have
suggested it should be, understanding occurs only when ra-
tional engagement has been made possible.  But the phe-
nomenon highlighted above is arguably a general one: if a
speaker knows only the standing meaning of an uttered
sentence, not the context-dependent meaning it expresses on
that occasion of use, then she will typically be in no position
to engage the speaker rationally.  So she will not have un-
derstood.42
What I have been trying to do here is to establish a con-
nection between demonstrative utterances, on the one hand,
40Some of my reasons for this claim will come to the fore in the discussion
in section 5.  One of my students, Michael Rescorla, has been pursuing the idea,
as well, in his work.
41It would be nice if the fact that communication serves to make the transfer
of information possible could be argued to follow from this more general pur-
pose.
42Thanks for Paul Coppock for discussions that profoundly influenced the
last few paragraphs.
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and demonstrative Thoughts, on the other: I have been ar-
guing that, to understand a demonstrative utterance, one
must entertain an appropriate demonstrative Thought.  To
understand an utterance of 'That ship is an aircraft carrier',
for example, one must think something like "The speaker is
saying that that ship is an aircraft carrier" (thinking of the
ship in question demonstratively).  There are, however, uses
of demonstratives which do not fit neatly into this picture:
one can use a demonstrative to refer to an object, even if one
does not oneself know to which object one is referring.  Per-
haps the most famous example of this sort is due to Kaplan.
Pointing back over his head, he says, "That is a picture of a
great philosopher."  He thinks he is pointing at his beloved
picture of Carnap—which, as it turns out, someone has re-
cently replaced with a picture of Spiro Agnew.43
The example merits extended discussion; it has received
such in the literature.  But I do not think we need to worry
too much about it here.  There is something pathological
about the case, something one might be tempted to record
by saying that Kaplan does not understand, or does not
know, what he himself has said.44  If that sounds odd, then
that is because we have been concentrating on the under-
standing other people have of what one has said.  Kaplan's
example should serve to remind us that communication is a
two-sided process: we cannot understand it without consid-
ering the speaker's side of the exchange as well as the
hearer's.  Communicative success—which amounts to mak-
ing the transfer of information (more generally, rational en-
gagement) possible—requires both the speaker and the
audience to do their parts.  It is the audience's responsibility
43For the example, see Kaplan, "Dthat," p. 239.
44See Evans, Varieties of Reference, pp. 171, 317-20.  See also Kaplan,
"Dthat," p. 231: "Erroneous beliefs may lead a speaker to put on a demonstration
which does not demonstrate what he thinks it does, with the result that he will be
under a misapprehension as to what he has said."
to identify the belief the speaker is expressing.  But they will
be able to do that only if the speaker makes it possible for
them to do so: the speaker must make sure that her words
really do express the belief that she means to be expressing.
In the example, Kaplan has let his audience down at just this
point.  He has failed to "speak with understanding," as we
might put it: he has not made it possible for his audience to
acquire the belief he meant to be expressing, since his words
do not express that belief at all.  If he is to speak with under-
standing, then he must know, just as his audience must
know, which object he is demonstrating, or to whom he is
speaking, or what have you.  And, in the example, Kaplan
has no such knowledge.45
My arguments so far do not show that the descriptive in-
formation that constitutes the standing meaning of an in-
dexical is no part of what is expressed by an utterance of a
sentence that contains it; they only show that more is re-
quired, if one is to understand such an utterance, than that
one know its standing meaning.  So the arguments do not
yet refute the "two factor" theory of the meanings of demon-
strative and indexical utterances.  But the attractions of that
view are somewhat diminished by the arguments just given.
It would certainly seem to follow from the alternative pic-
ture I have been trying to motivate that the two-factor view
is incorrect: standing meaning, on this view, is precisely not
part of what is said.  Reflection on reports of what has been
said reinforce this conclusion.  If someone says to Bill
45Of course, Kaplan would have had such knowledge—or so it would
seem—had his picture of Carnap not been pilfered.  What shall we say in this
case?  Here again, I am somewhat unsure what to say; but I am inclined to re-
spond as I did earlier, in note 38, regarding what seems to be a similar case.  If
Kaplan does know, his knowledge is not robust, in the way that his interlocutors'
would be: were he to come to suspect that the picture had been pilfered, his own
understanding of what he had said would be called into doubt, in a way that his
interlocutors' would not be (if they could perceive the picture).
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Clinton "You are a philosopher," I can truly say, "He said
that that person is a philosopher," demonstrating Bill
Clinton—as truly as if he had demonstrated Bill Clinton and
said "That person is a philosopher."
Now, I warned earlier against confusing questions about
belief-attribution with questions about the nature of belief.  I
would be inclined to issue a similar warning against con-
fusing questions about the attribution of sayings with ques-
tions about what is said.  But I do not mean to be ignoring
my own warnings.  The phenomenon just noted is not due to
special features of attributions; it is due to features of say-
ings themselves.  Suppose someone says to Bill Clinton "You
are a philosopher," and I wish to disagree with her.  I do not
have to turn to Bill Clinton and say "You are not a philoso-
pher": I can simply demonstrate Bill Clinton and say, to the
original speaker, "He is not a philosopher."  There is a strong
intuition that, when I do so, I contradict what the original
speaker said, in a way that does not play upon identifica-
tions of the Hesperus-Phosphorous sort.  If so, then it is hard
to see what point there might be in including the descriptive
information associated with 'you' in what is said, when we
already have a perfectly good way of taking note of its con-
tribution, by putting it into the antecedent of a conditional-
ized T-sentence.46
A more difficult case is the case of 'I'.  If we follow the
pattern displayed by 'you', we will be led to the following
conditionalized T-sentence:
(11) If U is an utterance of 'I am F', and if x is the
speaker, then U is true iff x is F.
46Compare Perry's remarks about 'you' in the Postscript to "Frege on De-
monstratives," pp. 29-30.  It will be obvious that I do not agree with the conclu-
sions Perry draws from these remarks, but I am nonetheless deeply indebted to
Perry's discussion.  This paper began as an attempt to answer his criticisms of
Evans's position.
But one might worry that such an account of 'I' will fail to
give proper place to the fact that the beliefs speakers express
using 'I' are self-conscious beliefs.  The suggestion will then
be that we can remedy the situation by including in what is
said the fact that 'I' refers to the speaker, that is, by including
its standing meaning in what is said.  I think such worries
misplaced.  For one thing, I find it obscure why including
the standing meaning of 'I' in what is said should be thought
to help: it would, if there were some reason to suppose that
the self-conscious way of thinking of an object was the
standing meaning of 'I', but we have already seen reason to
doubt that that is true.  Moreover, insofar as the inclusion of
the standing meaning of 'I' in what is said does explain the
fact that the Thoughts thus expressed are self-conscious, the
same purpose is served by putting its standing meaning into
the antecedent of a conditionalized T-sentence.
Suppose Frege has amnesia and so does not know that he
is Frege.47  Then he cannot express his belief that Frege is a
philosopher (a belief he might have acquired at the library)
by uttering the sentence 'I am a philosopher'.  To do so, he
would have to know that his utterance of 'I' refers to Frege;
but that is precisely what he does not know.  More generally,
if someone is to express any belief at all by uttering the sen-
tence 'I am a philosopher', he must know what his utterance
of that sentence will mean; otherwise, he will fail to speak
with understanding, just as Kaplan did in the example con-
sidered above.  That is to say, where U is an utterance of 'I
am a philosopher', the speaker can express a belief by means
of this utterance only if he knows something of the form:
(12) U is true iff x is a philosopher.
47Amnesia cases are, of course, common in the literature. But this particular
aspect of them has never, so far as I know, been discussed before.  There are,
though, remarks in a similar spirit in Peacocke, Sense and Content, pp. 133-9.
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To know something of this form, he must know who the
speaker is.  But it is his intention to speak, and that seems to
mean that it is his intention that he himself should speak
these words: he knows, that is to say, that he is himself the
speaker; the character of his intention seems to make it nec-
essary that he have self-conscious knowledge that he is to be
the speaker.  Hence, the specific knowledge he has of the
form (12) is that U is true iff he himself is a philosopher.  So
the fact that utterances of 'I am F' express self-conscious be-
liefs simply follows from the statement of the standing
meaning of such sentences and the requirement that speak-
ers must know what they are saying if they are to express
their beliefs by uttering sentences of that form.
The case of 'I' should serve to remind us of a familiar
point: Information can be conveyed by an utterance in all
kinds of ways, not only by being (part of) what is said.  So
the fact that certain information is ordinarily conveyed by
utterances of a given sentence cannot give us conclusive rea-
son to suppose that such information is part of what is liter-
ally said by means of such an utterance.  Much of the resis-
tance to the claim that the "descriptive information" con-
tained in the standing meaning of an expression is no part of
what is said results from neglect of this point, one that is fa-
miliar from discussions of implicature but which also ap-
plies to standing meaning.  If someone says "I am a philoso-
pher," part of what is conveyed by such an utterance is that
the speaker self-consciously believes herself to be a philoso-
pher.  Similarly, if someone says "You are a philosopher,"
then part of what is conveyed is that she is talking to some-
one she thinks is a philosopher; "She is a philosopher," that
the person she demonstrates is female; and so forth.  But this
observation should not lead us to conclude that part of what
is expressed by an utterance of 'I am a philosopher' is that the
speaker self-consciously believes that she is a philosopher.
We can refuse to draw this conclusion and still explain the
observed facts.
4. The Indefensibility of the Naïve Conception
of Communication
The claim for which I have been arguing is this: One does
not understand an utterance of 'You are F' unless one knows
who is being addressed, nor an utterance of 'That is F' unless
one knows what has been demonstrated.  Moreover, the
standing meaning of the indexicals and demonstratives
contained in such utterances are no part of what is said by
means of them.  What is important here is not the conclu-
sion: it is widely accepted already.  What is important is the
argument given for it.  As mentioned above, my argument
makes no reference to modal (or other intensional) opera-
tors.  More importantly, however, unlike Kaplan's argument,
it neither depends upon nor obviously implies the claim that
what is expressed by means of such an utterance is a singu-
lar proposition, so it leaves open the possibility that utter-
ances of sentences containing demonstratives and indexicals
should have sense, not just reference.  Can that claim be
made at all plausible?
One might think not.  Consider again the kind of state-
ment I have been suggesting of the standing meaning of an
indexical, say, that of 'you':
(9') If U is an utterance of 'You are a philosopher',
and if x is the addressee of U, then U is true
iff x is a philosopher.
It is often said that variables are the directly referential ex-
pressions par excellence:48 a variable simply has a value (an
48See, e.g., David Kaplan, "Afterthoughts," in Themes from Kaplan,
pp. 565-614, at pp. 571-3.
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object, in this case) assigned to it; no sense is assigned along
with it.  So one might think that (9') can yield, as a statement
of what is said by a particular utterance of 'You are a phi-
losopher', only something like:
(12) U is true iff x is a philosopher
where the value of 'x' is the addressee of U.  If so, the propo-
sition expressed by this utterance can hardly fail to be sin-
gular, and uses of 'you' can hardly fail to be directly referen-
tial.
So to argue, however, is to overlook the fact that (9') and
(12) are intended as representations of the knowledge pos-
sessed by a speaker who knows the standing meaning of an
utterance, or understands it, respectively.  Certainly (9') is
stated using a variable, one which is universally quantified.
But to pass from (9') to a T-sentence giving the meaning of a
particular utterance, one must know a particular fact of the
form:
(13) t is the addressee of U.
Here t is not a (free) variable which has been assigned a
value, but a schematic letter.  Our hypothetical speaker
needs to have a specific belief of this kind; in having such a
belief, she will—by thesis (1a)—have to think of the object
denoted by t in some particular way.  This belief will, in
conjunction with (9'), then lead to a specific belief of the
form:
(14) U is true iff t is philosopher.
And here again, our speaker will be thinking of the object
denoted by t in some particular way, typically, in a demon-
strative way.  The knowledge of the form (14) in which her
understanding consists will thus be something like "U is true
iff that person is a philosopher."
So, if one is to understand an utterance of 'You are a
philosopher', one must think of the object that is in fact the
addressee in some particular way, typically, in some demon-
strative way.  Of course, that is good for Frege.  But it leaves
us far short of a Fregean view of demonstratives: in particu-
lar, it does not provide us with any way to defend thesis (5),
that is, to defend Frege's identification of the sense that is
expressed by a particular utterance with a Thought.  Cer-
tainly, if one is to understand an utterance, one must think
of the objects denoted by demonstratives contained in the
uttered sentence in some way or other; but that is just a con-
sequence of the fact that belief is intensional—a consequence
of thesis (1a).  Nothing that has yet been said so much as
suggests that there need be any interesting relation between
the ways different speakers think of the referent, other than
that they must all think of the right object (i.e., that they
must know which object is in question).  To put the point
differently, nothing yet said suggests that how one thinks of
the object reflects any objective feature of the utterance,
rather than simply being a subjective matter of no linguistic
interest, on a par with the ideas one associates with an ex-
pression.  But now it should be clear that thesis (5) has not
only not been defended; it is actually in a fair bit of trouble.
The argument I used to motivate (and indeed to explain)
thesis (5) depended upon the assumption that, when I com-
municate with other speakers, my intention is that they
should come to believe the very Thoughts I am expressing.
This assumption is indefensible.  The problem is most
dramatic in the case of 'I'.  The belief that someone expresses
when she says "I am a philosopher" is the self-conscious be-
lief that she herself is a philosopher.  But the belief I form, if I
accept what she says as true, is not the self-conscious belief
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that she is a philosopher: I cannot so much as entertain that
belief.  Her self-conscious belief that she is a philosopher,
though it involves a Thought to which I can refer, one I
might well know her to believe,49 is in that sense private to
her.  This follows from our earlier discussion of indexical
beliefs.  What accounts for the essential indexicality of her
self-conscious Thoughts is the fact that her self-conscious
Thoughts are ones only she can entertain.50  The belief I ac-
quire cannot be the belief the speaker is expressing; it is, in-
stead, the belief that she (the speaker) is a philosopher, a be-
lief that involves a demonstrative (and not a self-conscious)
way of thinking of her.
Frege is not unaware of the problem to which this exam-
ple gives rise: he confronts it directly in his only serious dis-
cussion of context-dependence.  He writes:51
Now everyone is presented to himself in a special and
primitive way, in which he is presented to no-one else.
So, when Dr. Lauben has the thought that he was
wounded, he will probably be basing it on this primitive
way in which he is presented to himself.  And only Dr.
Lauben himself can grasp thoughts specified in this way.
But now he may want to communicate with others.  He
cannot communicate a thought he alone can grasp.
Therefore, if he now says 'I was wounded', he must use
'I' in a sense which can be grasped by others, perhaps in
the sense of 'he who is speaking to you at this moment';
by doing this, he makes the conditions accompanying
his utterance serve towards the expression of a thought.
We can here see the Naïve Conception of Communication at
work: Frege is supposing that to communicate his Thought,
49See Peacocke, Sense and Content, pp. 121-2, for this idea.
50It does not matter here whether this is because the two-factor theory is
true, so that the object of the Thought is "part" of it, or because such Thoughts
are object-dependent, as Evans would have it.
51Frege, "Thoughts," pp. 359-60, op. 66.
Dr. Lauben must get his audience to entertain the Thought
he is expressing.  But that is impossible if he is expressing
the self-conscious Thought that he has been wounded.  So
Frege is forced to introduce a special, communicative sense
for 'I', which he identifies with its standing meaning.  Un-
fortunately, however, his doing so does not resolve the
problem, for as we saw in the last section, the standing
meaning of 'I' is no part of what is expressed by utterances of
sentences containing it.
A similar, though less dramatic, problem arises even for
demonstratives.  Suppose someone says, "That bottle is half-
empty."  Must I think of the bottle in the very same way she
does if I am to understand her?  I think not.  If I can perceive
the bottle—if I can think of it demonstratively—I may well
be in a position to know which bottle is in question: I may
know that she is demonstrating that bottle and so know that
her utterance is true if, and only if, that bottle is half-empty.
If so, I will understand her utterance: I will know its truth-
condition.  But my perspective on the bottle may be suffi-
ciently different from hers that my Thought is, by the usual
Fregean criterion, different from the one the speaker was ex-
pressing.  Someone could believe that that bottle is half-
empty when she thinks about it in a demonstrative way ap-
propriate to perceiving it from one side, while denying that
it is half-empty (or being agnostic about the matter) when
she thinks about it in a demonstrative way appropriate to
perceiving it from the other side: she might well fail to real-
ize that the same bottle is in question both times.52
So it would appear that the initial assumption underlying
the argument I gave above for thesis (5), that understanding
requires one to entertain the very Thought the speaker is ex-
52Evans suggests that one might avoid this consequence by appealing to his
treatment of what Kaplan called "cognitive dynamics": See Varieties of Refer-
ence, pp. 341-2.  I am skeptical, but shall not discuss the matter here.
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pressing, is untenable.  One might try to resist this conclu-
sion in two ways.  First, one might insist that this condition
on understanding is an ideal to which ordinary communica-
tion only approximates.53  Such a move has a certifiable Fre-
gean pedigree,54 but I find it deeply problematic.  For one
thing, the ideal cannot possibly be achieved in the case of 'I'.
For another, our interest as philosophers of language should
not be in some ideal form of communication, however at-
tractive, but in communication as we have it.  It needs to be
shown, at least, that the ideal somehow shapes or guides
actual communicative practices.  But I do not believe that
that can be done, because there is a perfectly reasonable ac-
count of what understanding involves that does not require
any "guiding ideal," yet which yields it as a kind of "best case
scenario."
Frege himself suggests such an account. Discussing a
case in which two speakers associate different senses with a
certain proper name, he writes:55
...[A]s far as the proper name 'Dr. Gustav Lauben' is con-
cerned, [these speakers] do not speak the same lan-
guage, although they do in fact refer to the same man
with this name; for they do not know that they are doing so.
Note the italicized clause: the important condition on under-
standing is that one should know what is denoted by the
various referring expressions being used.  Ideally, perhaps,
one should think of the objects in the very same way the
speaker does: if one does so, one will thereby minimize the
53See Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language, pp. 105ff.  In "Frege on
Sense and Linguistic Meaning," Burge argues that the notion of sense was, for
Frege, a certain sort of idealization—though not, as far as I can see, an idealiza-
tion of the sort that would help here.
54See Frege, "Thoughts," p. 359, op. 66; and the famous footnote 4 to "On
Sense and Reference," p. 158, op. 27.
55Frege, "Thoughts," p. 359, op. 65; my italics.
chance that one might fail to have such knowledge.56  But the
alleged ideal then follows from the sort of condition on un-
derstanding we have been deploying all along.  And that
condition can be satisfied even when we do not think of the
object in the same way the speaker does.57
So we cannot defend thesis (5) by construing the condi-
tion that speaker and hearer think of the object in the very
same way as an ideal.
Another option is to identify what is said by means of an
utterance with the content of the belief the speaker is ex-
pressing on that occasion.  This would certainly preserve
thesis (5), but it would do so in letter only.  It is far from
clear why a direct-reference theorist should have any prob-
lem with this sort of identification: so far as I can see, he
could accept it but regard it as a merely stipulative defini-
tion.  Certainly speakers say what they do because they be-
lieve what they say to be true: that is why what someone
says is a reliable guide to what she believes; someone's say-
ing something is, typically, to be explained (rationally, not
just causally) in part in terms of her beliefs.  We might say
that speakers voice their beliefs when they speak.  But this is
just a truism: it leaves us far short of the claim that speakers
express their beliefs, if this is supposed to mean that the
contents of their utterances are the contents of the beliefs
56It would minimize the danger, not eliminate it.  This is the central point of
my response to Alex Byrne and Michael Thau, "In Defense of the Hybrid
View," in my "Communication and Knowledge: Rejoinder to Byrne and Thau."
Both are in Mind 105 (1996), pp. 139-49 and 151-6, respectively.
57Another idea would be that, in such circumstances, the speaker and hearer
really are thinking of the object in the same way, so that the identity conditions
of modes of presentation are themselves sensitive to context.  Dan Vest urged
this view upon me and has been developing it in his recent work.  Some of my
own remarks in "The Sense of Communication" could be taken similarly.  But I
no longer find this view attractive, substantively speaking, for reasons I shall not
discuss now.  (Some of the what I have to say in section 6 bears upon this issue.)
Vest may, on the other hand, be right that Frege himself held some such view.
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they thereby voice; additional justification is required if this
inference is to be legitimate.  If the speaker and her ad-
dressee had to grasp the same Thought if communication
were to be successful, that would provide the necessary jus-
tification; but the antecedent of this conditional is false.  And
since one's understanding of what someone has said does
not depend upon one's grasping the very Thought she was
voicing, why should we privilege the speaker by identifying
what is said with the content of the belief she voices?  Why
not identify it instead with that of the belief someone who
understands the utterance would thus acquire were she to
accept it as true?  Granted, there is no single such belief.  But
that is precisely what makes the proposed identification of
what is said with what is voiced seem so ad hoc in the first
place.
5. In the Ruins of the Naïve Conception
So Frege's view that utterances express Thoughts cannot be
defended.  But I wonder just how significant a concession
that is.
Suppose that the Naïve Conception had failed only be-
cause, for each (utterance of a) referring expression, there
were exactly two ways in which one could think of the refer-
ent and still understand that utterance.  There would then, of
course, be no one Thought to be identified as the meaning of
'John has gone fishing', say.  But it would still be a fact about
the name 'John' that, to understand utterances of sentences
containing it, one must think of its referent in one of those
two ways.  Such a fact seems no less one about the meaning
of the name for this diversity: if it would have been a fact
about the name's meaning that there was just one permissi-
ble way to think of its bearer, had that been a fact, I do not
see why it should not also have been a fact about its mean-
ing had there been just two.  Of course, any such supposition
is utterly artificial, indeed, obviously false.  But there are less
artificial suggestions in the vicinity.  Suppose there were, for
each utterance of a referring expression, a restricted cluster
of ways in which one could think of the referent and yet un-
derstand that utterance.  Then, again, the mere diversity
does not seem impressive: it still seems to be a fact about the
meaning of that utterance that one must think of the referent
in one of the permitted ways if one is to understand it; it
seems no less a fact about it, anyway, simply in virtue of the
plurality of permitted ways.
Something like that is, I think, how things are, at least in
the case of demonstratives and indexicals.58 Only a little
more reflection on the Enterprise example is needed to estab-
lish the point.  Suppose I say, pointing towards the bow,
"That ship is an aircraft carrier."  Suppose further that I
know that it is.  Then, ordinarily, if my addressee under-
stands what I have said and accepts it as true, she will
thereby come to know something,59 namely, what she could
now express by pointing toward the bow and saying, "That
ship is an aircraft carrier."  But suppose that, instead of
forming the belief she could express that way, she instead
58Proper names are another matter, and I am not sure what to say about
them.  I am inclined to think that they are similar, but I am unsure what to say
about the contents of the beliefs we express using names and so remain unsure
what to say about their meanings.  Still, the general points to be made here will
apply to them in some form: certainly, there are going to be restrictions upon
how one can think of the referent of a proper name and understand utterances of
it.
59It is at this sort of point that the difference between the belief I express and
the belief my addressee forms becomes annoying: were I to speak of my belief
that that ship is an aircraft carrier, and her belief that that ship is an aircraft car-
rier (where our Thoughts both focus, as it were, on the bow), my language
would make it seem as if we must have the same belief; but that is precisely the
implication I am trying to avoid.  That is why I speak, in the text, of the sen-
tences by means of which we might express our beliefs: the difference between
them is not so easy to capture.
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formed the belief she would express by pointing towards the
stern and saying, "That ship is an aircraft carrier."  These are
different beliefs.  Now suppose neither I nor my addressee
knows that the ships are the same, and that I myself do not
know, do not even believe, that that ship (pointing to the
stern) is an aircraft carrier.  Although my addressee could
certainly come to believe that thatstern ship is an aircraft carrier
in this way, she cannot thus come to know that it is—she
cannot learn from me that it is—for it is a basic fact about
communication that it can only transfer, and can never cre-
ate, knowledge.60
This sort of example may seem unsurprising.  It is per-
haps more surprising that the same sort of phenomenon oc-
curs with indexicals, such as 'I' and 'you'.61  Suppose Super-
man swoops down onto the boardwalk and stops an out-of-
control bus with his superhuman strength.  Lois might say to
him, "You saved a hundred lives!"  Then if Lois knows what
she has said to be true, and if I accept what she has said as
true, then I can come to know that that man saved a hun-
dred lives and, indeed, that Superman did, if I know that
60In case one is not inclined to agree, suppose my addressee could thus
come to know that thatstern ship is an aircraft carrier.  Nothing stops her from
saying to me, "Thatstern ship is an aircraft carrier," whence I could come to know
that it is.  But that is absurd: I cannot come to know that thatstern ship is an air-
craft carrier in that kind of way.
Of course, when I deny that communication can create knowledge, I have in
mind only this, typical sort of transfer of belief.  Obviously, that I said what I
did can lead to others' having knowledge that I do not have, even knowledge of
the very thing I thereby express; but not by their learning it from me.
61This sort of example has been discussed, in connection with attribution:
See Mark Richard, "Direct Reference and Ascriptions of Belief," Journal of
Philosophical Logic 12 (1983): 425-52; and John Perry and Mark Crimmins,
"The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs," in The Problem
of the Essential Indexical, pp. 249-78.  To the best of my knowledge, however,
its implications for our conception of communication have not been seriously
discussed.
that man is Superman.  But I cannot thereby come to know
that that man (the one emerging from the phone booth
wearing nerdy glasses) saved a hundred lives, nor can I
come to know that Clark Kent did so, without appealing to
additional background knowledge.  Similar conclusions can
be drawn about the case in which Superman himself says, "I
saved a hundred lives."  Variations will allow us to draw
similar conclusions about other indexicals.
To understand the significance of such examples, we
need to consider again what is involved in understanding
demonstrative and indexical utterances.  Consider the Enter-
prise example.  When I say, "That ship is an aircraft carrier,"
pointing to the bow, my addressee, in virtue of her compe-
tence as a speaker of English, will know:
(15) If x is the demonstratum, then Heck's utter-
ance is true iff x is an aircraft carrier.
To understand the utterance, however, she must also know
which object I demonstrated, so she can advance to knowl-
edge of something of the form:
(16) Heck's utterance is true iff t is an aircraft car-
rier.
But if we assume that my addressee is as much in the dark
about the identity of the ship we see on either side of the
building as I am, she will not know what I demonstrated
unless she focuses upon the bow.62  So she may be in a position
to know
62I am assuming that I have done my part and indicated which ship I have in
mind in such a way as to focus attention upon the bow.  I am assuming, that is,
that I have "spoken with understanding," to use the language used above.  See
the next note.
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(17) Heck's utterance is true iff thatbow ship is an
aircraft carrier
and so, if she is prepared to accept that what I have said is
true, will be able to conclude that thatbow ship is an aircraft
carrier.  On the other hand, however, she is in no position to
know that the demonstratum is thatstern ship.  So she is in no
position to know:
(18) Heck's utterance is true iff thatstern ship is an
aircraft carrier.
So, even if she does accept my utterance as true, she is in no
position to acquire knowledge that thatstern ship is an aircraft
carrier.  That is because she can only form that belief, on the
grounds that I said what I did, if she misunderstands what I
have said.  She may believe (18), even truly, but she does not
know (18), so it cannot support knowledge that thatstern ship
is an aircraft carrier.  That is, it is her failure to know
(18)—her failure to know the truth-condition of my utter-
ance—that frustrates her attempt to acquire knowledge that
thatstern ship is an aircraft carrier from what I have said.  (Ob-
viously, a similar story can be told about the Superman
cases.)63
To sum up: If my addressee hears me, takes what I say as
true, and for that reason forms the belief, not that thatbow
63I have been concentrating here on the understanding one has of the utter-
ances of others.  But there are conclusions to be drawn, as well, about what is
involved in "speaking with understanding," to use a phrase I used above.  (It is at
this point that I think my remarks here may bear upon the issue I set aside ear-
lier, what it is for an object to be the demonstratum, in a given context.)  If one
is to express one's belief that thatbow ship is an aircraft carrier, one must not only
demonstrate the right ship; one must do so in such a way that one knows that
what one has demonstrated is indeed thatbow ship, and in such a way that one's
addressee can come to know something similar.  (See Evans, Varieties of Refer-
ence, section 9.2, for similar remarks.)
ship is an aircraft carrier, but that thatstern ship is an aircraft
carrier, she cannot thereby come to know that it is.  We need
an explanation of this fact, and it is obscure to me what sort
of explanation can be provided, other than one that, like that
just sketched, focuses attention upon the fact that my ad-
dressee is in a position to know that I have demonstrated
thatbow ship, but is in not in a position to know that I have
demonstrated thatstern ship.  In any event, what the discus-
sion shows is that utterances of demonstrative expressions
can differ, in ways relevant to understanding and communi-
cation, even when they do not differ in their referential
properties: the successful communication of information
from one speaker to another depends not only upon speak-
ers' identifying the right objects as the demonstrata, but also
upon their thinking of these objects in the right sorts of
ways, although it does not depend upon their thinking of the
objects in any particular ways.
What I am claiming, then, is that understanding an utter-
ance of, say, 'That ship is an aircraft carrier' requires, not just
that one correctly identify the referent of the demonstrative,
but that one think of the reference in an appropriate sort of
way—in such a way, in particular, that one can know what
the referent is.  But one might want to deny this: one way to
do so is to deny that, to understand such an utterance, one
must know something like (18).  Obviously, if understanding
a demonstrative utterance does not require one to know
what the demonstrative denotes (on that occasion of use),
but only that one have a true belief about what it denotes,
then the examples will not show that understanding requires
one to think of the referent in the right sort of way.  Any old
way would do.
I have been assuming throughout that understanding in-
volves semantic knowledge in this sense.  But one might
now want to ask (if one did not want to ask earlier) with
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what right I have been doing so.  One need not deny that it
is intuitively natural to take understanding to amount to
knowing what is said: after all, we use 'understanding' and
'knowing the meaning' as near synonyms, in ordinary lan-
guage.  But I am putting much too much theoretical weight
upon the notion of understanding for the claim that under-
standing involves semantic knowledge to be allowed to rest
entirely on intuition.  If understanding, in the sense relevant
here, requires only that one truly believe something like (18),
then my analysis of the examples is flawed and there will be
no restrictions upon how one may think of the object de-
noted if one is to understand an utterance of a demonstra-
tive.
Earlier, I suggested that we use 'understand' in such a
way that understanding occurs when the fundamental pur-
poses of a communicative exchange have been served.  I
further suggested that one such fundamental purpose is to
make the transfer of information possible.  What I was
claiming, in effect, was that we should use 'understand' in
such a way that the following principle is satisfied:64
(UK)If S knows that p and utters a sentence, P,
whereby she expresses this belief, and if A
hears the utterance, understands it, and ac-
cepts it as true, then (modulo the usual sorts
of defeating conditions, regarding S's sincer-
ity and the like) A can thereby come to know
(something suitably related to the content of
S's belief) that p.
As a slogan: Understanding enables the transmission of
knowledge.  It follows from (UK) that, in the cases we have
64See Gareth Evans, Varieties of Reference, pp. 310-11, for one version of
this idea, which is central to the argument of "The Sense of Communication."
been considering, understanding is absent: as our previous
discussion showed, the transmission of knowledge has not
been enabled.
I find (UK) an attractive principle, myself. But not every-
one does, and one who disagreed with my analysis of the
cases in question might suggest we should explore alterna-
tives.  An obvious alternative is to say that the "fundamental
purpose of communication" relevant to our use of the word
'understanding' is that it should transfer, not knowledge, but
just true belief.65  Then true belief would suffice for under-
standing and the examples will not show what I have said
they do.  More worryingly, (UK) at least appears to incorpo-
rate a fairly substantial claim about the epistemology of tes-
timony, so it might be expected to be controversial for that
reason, too.
Fortunately, there is a much weaker principle that leads
to the same conclusion as that for which I invoked (UK), that
understanding is absent in the examples we have been dis-
cussing.  The alternative principle is:
(UV)If S utters a sentence, P, and if A understands
her but denies that what she has said is true,
then their disagreement cannot be merely
verbal.
As a slogan: Understanding is incompatible with the exis-
tence of verbal disagreements.  What I mean by a "merely
verbal disagreement" is a merely apparent disagreement that
can be resolved to the satisfaction of the disputants by
means of a linguistic stipulation or clarification.  For exam-
ple, suppose I say, "Kareem Abdul-Jabbar is a great athlete,"
65I discuss this particular proposal in "The Sense of Communication": see
pp. 85-6, 90-2.  But other responses are possible, including a suggestion that, in
examples like these, defeating conditions are present.  See Byrne and Thau, for
instance.
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and someone else disagrees with me.  Further discussion
may reveal that, whereas I meant to be talking about Kareem
the basketball player, she meant Kareem the football player.
Once that has been recognized, this disagreement has been
revealed as merely apparent.  And the same sort of phe-
nomenon can occur even if we are talking, unbeknownst to
us, about the same person.  If I say, "Bill Bradley was a great
athlete," and Alex disagrees with me, our disagreement will
be revealed to be merely verbal, in this sense, if it becomes
clear that I meant to be talking about Bradley the basketball
star whereas she meant Bradley the politician and neither of
us knows that these are the same person.  In a sense, of
course, our disagreement is real: we cannot both be right.
But we need not be in any disagreement with one another:
we might both believe that Bradley the Knickerbocker was a
great athlete and that Bradley the politician was not.  Of
course, neither my beliefs nor Alex's can both be true, but
that is not to the point.  What matters is that the structure of
our dispute is the same as in the Kareem case: the dispute
between us is merely apparent; it can be resolved to our joint
satisfaction by stipulation or clarification.
A complete development and defense of (UV) would, I
think, have to draw upon the idea, mentioned earlier, that a
fundamental purpose of communication is to make it possi-
ble for speakers to engage one another rationally.  The
problem with "merely verbal disagreements," in my sense, is
precisely that there is no real engagement between the
speakers in such cases.  If a disagreement can be settled by
means of a stipulation or clarification, then the disputants
are not disagreeing about the facts.  They are not disagreeing
at all: their dispute is, on the contrary, the interpersonal
analogue of a fallacy of equivocation.  Let me not pursue
(UV)'s development here, though.  For it seems clear that,
however it might be spelled out, it will imply—just as the
controversial (UK) does—that understanding is absent in the
examples we have been discussing.  In examples like the En-
terprise example, merely verbal disagreements can obviously
occur: if I say, "Thatbow ship is an aircraft carrier," and my
interlocutor responds, "I see no reason at all to believe that
thatstern ship is an aircraft carrier," then I can respond, "Nor
do I; but I didn't say that thatstern ship is an aircraft carrier,
only that thatbow ship is an aircraft carrier."
6. Closing: A Somewhat Radical Suggestion
I take myself to have established that, although under-
standing an utterance of a demonstrative or indexical ex-
pression does not require one to think of its referent in the
same way the speaker does, there are nonetheless substantial
restrictions on how one can think of it and still understand.
These restrictions are, of course, determined by context, but
it remains the case that, for any utterance of a referring ex-
pression, there will be a restricted cluster of ways one may
think of the referent and still understand that utterance.
What should we make of this fact?
One answer, of course, is that we should make nothing of
it, at least as regards meaning.  What has been shown is, at
most, that certain conditions that must be satisfied if com-
munication is to succeed in certain sorts of cases.  But what,
the objector might continue, do requirements on successful
communication have to do with facts about meaning?  Even
if understanding an utterance involved the audience's com-
ing to share a belief with the speaker, as the Naïve Concep-
tion has it, that would imply nothing about meaning and so,
in particular, would not imply thesis (5), as I earlier claimed
it did.
Such a response seems to me to change the subject.  If the
Naïve Conception were acceptable, it would be a fact about
the name 'Hesperus' that, to understand utterances of sen-
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tences containing it, one must think of its referent in a par-
ticular way.  One can deny that this fact about 'Hesperus' is a
fact about its meaning, but it is far from obvious that, in do-
ing so, one is not just arguing terminology.66  There may be a
substantial issue here.  But if so, Frege's position is hardly an
unreasonable one.  What is at issue is, in effect, whether the
theory of meaning is to be conceived as, in some way or
other, embedded within a general theory of linguistic com-
munication.  That it should be is a familiar claim: for all their
differences, Grice, Lewis, Davidson, and Dummett, for ex-
ample, would all agree that it is.  For present purposes, then,
let me simply assume that some version of this familiar the-
sis is correct.  If the arguments here show only that direct
reference theorists must reject it, that is enough for me.67
Of course, the Naïve Conception is not acceptable, and
thesis (5) must be rejected, too.  And, reluctantly, I think we
must therefore conclude that the sorts of examples we have
been discussing will not allow us to resuscitate Frege's view
that utterances of referring expressions have sense as well as
reference.  Since the notion of sense is, as I said earlier, pri-
marily a psychological one, the claim that demonstratives
have sense as well as reference is best understood as the
claim that utterances of sentences containing demonstratives
express Thoughts: it is, that is to say, essentially equivalent
to thesis (5), which, sadly, has been rejected.  On the other
hand, though, as I suggested at the beginning of the last sec-
tion, it is nonetheless a fact about an utterance of a demon-
strative that one must think of its referent in an appropriate
sort of way if one is to understand it.  That seems no less a
fact about its meaning simply in virtue of the plurality of
66For a different sort of worry that there is a failure of engagement between
Fregeans and Russellians, see William Taschek, "Frege's Puzzle, Sense, and In-
formation Content," Mind 101 (1992): 767-91.
67For discussion of related issues, see Jason Stanley, "Modality and What Is
Said," forthcoming in Philosophical Perspectives.
permissible ways of thinking of the object.  Nor does it seem
less a fact about its meaning in virtue of the fact that which
ways are permissible is fixed not by standing meaning alone
but in large part by context.  That, after all, is what one
should expect.
 S o t h e q u e s t i o n I a m r a i s i n g i s : H o w , w i t h i n a
framework that takes facts about meaning in some way or
other to emerge from facts about successful communication,
might one understand and defend the thesis that demon-
stratives are directly referential, in light of the facts about
successful communication that emerged in the last section?
One conclusion we can draw immediately is that attempts to
do so by denying that there are any substantial restrictions
upon how one might think of the referent fail.  Such a de-
fense is, for example, developed by Stephen Schiffer in "In-
dexicals and the Theory of Reference."68  For Schiffer, who is
here working within a broadly Gricean framework, the
meaning of an utterance is (ignoring the usual complica-
tions) the content of the belief I intend you to form in reac-
tion to that utterance.  Schiffer wants to hold, with Kaplan et
al., that utterances containing demonstratives express (with
respect to the demonstrative) singular propositions.  But he
also accepts thesis (1a), that beliefs are individuated roughly
as Frege thought they should be: no singular proposition can
be the content of the belief I intend you to form when I utter,
say, 'That is poisonous', for the simple reason that singular
propositions are never the contents of beliefs.  So Schiffer has
a problem.  His solution, very roughly, is that my communi-
cative intention abstracts from ways of thinking of the object
I demonstrate: I do not intend you to think of the object in
any particular way; I intend only that you should think of
the object, to the effect that it is poisonous.  The idea here is
68Stephen Schiffer, "Indexicals and the Theory of Reference," Synthese 49
(1981): 43-100; see esp. pp. 71-8.
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independent of the details of Schiffer's position: it is that no
more is required to understand an utterance of a demon-
strative than that one should think of the object that is, in
fact, its referent; all that is required is that one should get its
reference right; there is no restriction upon how one may
think of it.  If that were right, then demonstratives would be
directly referential.
The examples discussed in the last section show that this
view cannot be sustained.  Schiffer is, in my view, right that
there is no particular way I intend you to think of the object
demonstrated, but it just doesn't follow that I intend only
that you should think of the object, with no restriction what-
soever upon how you think of it: when I say, "Thatbow ship is
an aircraft carrier," it is not just irrelevant how you think of
the referent; you misunderstand me, or so I argued, if you
think of it as thatstern ship.
This point can be developed in a somewhat different
way.  Consider, first, an example discussed earlier, in con-
nection with the Naïve Conception of Communication.  You
are looking for your friend John, and I tell you, "John has
gone fishing," wanting you to come to believe that he has
and so to stop your search.  Clearly, my ultimate inten-
tion—that you stop your search—depends crucially upon
your coming to believe that John has gone fishing.  As I de-
scribed the example, your believing that Jack has gone fish-
ing simply will not do, so long as you don't believe that John
and Jack are one and the same.69  Indeed, if I know that John
is Jack, but know you do not know (maybe you steadfastly
refuse to believe it), then my intention may explicitly be that
you should think of John as John, rather than as Jack, even
though I know you would be thinking of John even if you
69Note that belief is the right notion here: it doesn't matter whether any of
these beliefs constitute knowledge, or whether they are true, or whether I am
speaking sincerely.
thought of him as Jack.  What matters is not how I think of
him, but how you do.
Similar examples may be constructed using demonstra-
tives and indexicals.  Suppose I know you believe that, if
thatbow ship is an aircraft carrier, then p, but do not believe
that, if thatstern ship is an aircraft carrier, then p.  I want you
to come to believe that p (perhaps for some evil purpose of
my own).  So I say, "Thatbow ship is an aircraft carrier," hop-
ing you will draw the obvious inference.  It is, again, crucial
to my ultimate intention that you should think of Enterprise
as thatbow ship, not as thatstern ship.
These sorts of cases are not, I think, unusual, nor even in
any way special.  When we say that a given object is F, we
quite often mean to communicate that it is, that is, to instill
in our audience a belief that the object is F.  Nor is that al-
ways our ultimate purpose: often, we wish the audience to
act upon the belief in some way.  But how our audience acts
upon the belief will obviously depend upon the way they
think of the object in question, since different ways of
thinking of it determine different beliefs.  Someone who says
"That man is George Orwell" chooses those words with a
purpose.  He might, for example, wish his audience to real-
ize that they are in the presence of the author of 1984 and act
accordingly.  (He would then be presuming that the audi-
ence knows that George Orwell wrote 1984.)  Of course,
other sentences would express the same singular proposi-
tion.  But they need not—and under familiar assumptions,
would not—have the same effect, because none of them
need instill the belief that that man is George Orwell.
Of course, the importance of the way we think of the ob-
ject will be more apparent in some cases than in others.  But
it will never fade completely into irrelevance.  If, as I have
suggested, one of the basic purposes of communication is to
make rational engagement between speakers possible, and
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if, as I also argued, rational engagement depends upon there
being a suitable relationship between the ways different
speakers think of the object, then speakers must always
strive to ensure that their ways of thinking of the object are
suitably related, at least in so far as they wish to engage one
another rationally.
I conclude, then, that Schiffer's defense of the claim that
demonstratives are directly referential fails.  There are surely
other ways of defending that claim.  But let me not try to put
a cat in front of every mouse hole.  I wish instead to make a
suggestion that may sound somewhat radical.  To make it, I
need to lay bare the facts as we now have them.  My sugges-
tion is going to be that we should simply rest with those
facts.
When a speaker makes an utterance, or hears one, she in
some sense "associates" a Thought with it: the Thought I
have in mind is, if she made the utterance, the one she
voiced by making it, and, if she heard it, the one she would
come to believe were she to accept it as true.  The notion of
association here is, of course, one that we all wish we could
clearly explain: part of what Grice, for example, is trying to
do is explain it.  I have my own preference.70  But I want to
work with the intuitive idea, in part to emphasize that the
point I wish to make does not depend upon any specific way
of developing it.  (That is not to say that what I say will not
restrict the acceptable ways of developing it.  I suspect, in
fact, that it does.)
For brevity, let us call the Thought a speaker associates
with an utterance, in this sense, its cognitive value for her.
Frege observes—this is almost just a corollary of thesis
(1a)—that different utterances that express the same singular
proposition may differ in cognitive value for a given
70I would seek to explain the relevant notion of association in terms of T-
sentences known by speakers, in roughly the terms employed in section 3.
speaker: a given speaker may "associate" different Thoughts
with such utterances.  Frege also holds that, to communicate
successfully, different speakers must associate the same
Thought with a given utterance.  That, or so I've argued, is
false.  If we reject that claim, thereby rejecting the Naïve
Conception of Communication—and with it thesis (5)—we
allow that different speakers can associate different
Thoughts with a given sentence and still understand one an-
other, that is, that a given utterance can differ in cognitive
value for two speakers without their being unable to com-
municate successfully.  On the other hand, though, there are
limits to the variation that successful communication will
tolerate: one cannot associate just any Thought with a given
utterance and still understand it; that much is obvious.
What may not have been obvious is that the limits are
stricter than Schiffer supposed: speakers cannot associate
with an utterance just any Thought that determines the right
singular proposition (so to speak) and still understand it.
That much I take to be relatively uncontroversial.  The
question that now arises is: How, given these facts, are we to
determine the meaning of an utterance?  No one of the dif-
ferent Thoughts different speakers might permissibly associ-
ate with an utterance is plausibly taken to be its meaning:
none of them is privileged over any of the others.  What
should be taken to be the utterance's meaning, then?
One idea, suggested in my own earlier work,71 is that one
should take the meaning of an utterance to be what is com-
mon to the cognitive values it has for different speakers.  So,
for instance, the meaning of an utterance of 'Thatbow ship is
an aircraft carrier' would be what is common to the different
Thoughts speakers who understand it associate with it.
And, one might suggest, the only thing common to all those
71See "The Sense of Communication," pp. 87-8.
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Thoughts is the singular proposition they determine: that
singular proposition is thus the meaning of the utterance,
and direct reference theorists are thereby vindicated.72  I find
it hard to evaluate this position, however, because I am un-
sure how to take the notion of commonality.  I can under-
stand well enough why one might want to say that what is
common is a singular proposition.  But it is far from clear
that there are no other options.  Minimally, one can construct
something finer-grained by abstraction: simply consider the
set of Thoughts speakers can permissibly associate with the
utterance; being a member of this set is something common
to all of them, but not necessarily to the Thoughts associated
with other utterances expressing the same singular proposi-
tion.73  That is artificial, to be sure.  But maybe there is
something less so.  I suggested earlier, following Evans, that
understanding an utterance containing a demonstrative re-
quires thinking of its referent demonstratively.  If so, the
various Thoughts speakers could associate with such an ut-
terance would have at least this much in common: they
would involve a demonstrative way of thinking of the rele-
vant object.
The real problem, though, is that it is unclear what inter-
est a notion of meaning so characterized has.  We can define
a notion of "what is common" to the various Thoughts
speakers associate with a given utterance and, if we like, call
that the utterance's "meaning."  Maybe the singular proposi-
tion that is determined by all those Thoughts will even turn
out to be what is common.  But at this point, all we have is a
theoretical construct looking for work, and it is  not obvious,
to me at least, that there is anything for it to do within the
72Scott Soames makes a similar proposal in his recent book Beyond Rigidity
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002).
73I think this is what I had in mind in "The Sense of Communication."
general theory of communication.  It still looks very much
like an abstraction, even if it is a somewhat less artificial one.
If one really wants to find something to call the meaning
of an utterance, then perhaps what is common to the cogni-
tive values the utterance has for different speakers is as good
a choice as any.  But why do we want to find something to
call the meaning?  What we (relatively) uncontroversially
have are speakers who associate Thoughts with utterances
and restrictions upon how the different Thoughts they asso-
ciate with a given utterance must be related if they are to
communicate successfully: to put it differently, we have the
fact that utterances have cognitive value for speakers, and
we have communicative norms determining how the cogni-
tive values a given utterance has for different speakers must
be related if they are to understand one another.  Those, it
seems to me, are the facts as we find them.
It is not unreasonable to want to identify something ob-
jective underlying the diversity, something shared that con-
strains variation.  Frege himself eloquently expresses several
reasons one might want such a thing.  But, I am now sug-
gesting, the tension between the real-life facts of communi-
cative practice and the demand for something shared are ul-
timately irreconcilable, unless we reconcile them by brute
force and just define something shared into existence.  I say
that we should abandon the demand, recognizing it as a
remnant of the Naïve Conception of Communication.  We
should seek to explain communication not in terms of
speakers' agreeing about what an utterance means but in
terms of there being an appropriate relation between the
Thoughts they associate with it.  If that means there is no
such thing as the meaning of an utterance—if all that are left
are the meaning it has for me, the meaning it has for you,
and some conditions on how these must relate if we are to
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communicate with one another—I'm not sure what, if any-
thing, has been lost.  That, it seems to me, is all there is.74
Bibliography
Almog, Joseph, John Perry and Howard Wettstein (eds.).
Themes from Kaplan (New York: Oxford University Press,
1989).
Braun, David.  "Demonstratives and Their Linguistic Mean-
ings," Noûs 30 (1996): 145-73.
——"Russellianism and Psychological Generalizations,"
Nous 34 (2000): 203-236.
Burge, Tyler.  "Demonstrative Constructions, Reference, and
Truth," Journal of Philosophy 71 (1974): 205-23.
——"Belief De Re," Journal of Philosophy 74 (1977): 338-62.
——"Sinning Against Frege," Philosophical Review 88
(1979): 398-432.
——"Frege on Sense and Linguistic Meaning," in D. Bell and
N. Cooper (eds.), The Analytic Tradition: Meaning, Thought
and Knowledge (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), pp. 30-60.
Byrne, Alex, and Michael Thau.  "In Defense of the Hybrid
View," Mind 105 (1996): 139-149 .
Davidson, Donald.  "On Saying That," in Inquiries Into Truth
and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 93-
74Thanks to Tyler Burge, Alex Byrne, Paul Coppock, Michael Glanzberg,
David Kaplan, Robert May, Christopher Peacocke, Jim Pryor, Susanna Siegel,
Jason Stanley, and Dan Vest for discussions that had great influence upon this
paper.  Thanks also to two anonymous referees for their comments, which led to
substantial changes of view, as well as clarifications.
Material from this paper was presented in graduate seminars given at Har-
vard University, in the Fall terms of 1997 and 1998.  Thanks to all who attended,
especially Ian Proops and Dean Pettit, as well as some of those already men-
tioned, for their contributions.  Talks based upon the paper were presented at
Harvard University, Cornell University, the University of Michigan, Yale Uni-
versity, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the University of Lisbon, and
the University of California at Irvine.  Thanks to all who attended these sessions
for their questions and comments.
108.
Dummett, Michael.  Frege: Philosophy of Language (Cambridge
MA: Harvard University Press, 1973).
——"Frege's Distinction Between Sense and Reference," in
Truth and Other Enigmas (London: Duckworth, 1978), pp.
116-44.
——"Frege's Myth of the Third Realm," in Frege and Other
Philosophers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 249-62.
Evans, Gareth.  Varieties of Reference (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1982).
Frege, Gottlob.  Collected Papers, ed. B. McGuinness (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1984).
——"On Sense and Reference," tr. M. Black, in Collected Pa-
pers, pp. 157-77.
——"Thoughts," tr. P. Geach and R.H. Stoothoff, in Collected
Papers, pp. 351-72.
——Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (Hildesheim: Georg Olms
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1966).
——The Basic Laws of Arithmetic: Exposition of the System, tr.
M. Furth (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964).
George, Alexander.  "Has Dummett Over-salted His Frege?
Remarks on the Conveyability of Thought," in R. Heck
(ed.), Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honour of Mi-
chael Dummett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 35-69.
Heck, Richard.  "The Sense of Communication,"  Mind 104
(1995): 79-106.
——"Communication and Knowledge: Rejoinder to Byrne
and Thau,"  Mind 105 (1996): 151-6.
Higginbotham, James.  "Contexts, Models, and Meanings," in
R. Kempson (ed.), Mental Representations: The Interface Be-
tween Language and Reality (NY: Cambridge University
Press, 1988), pp. 29-48.
Kaplan, David.  "Dthat," in P. Cole (ed.), Pragmatics (New
York: Academic Publishers, 1978), pp. 221-43.
——"Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic,
33
Richard G. Heck, Jr. Do Demonstratives Have Senses?
Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives," in
Almog, et al. (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, pp. 481-563.
——"Afterthoughts," in Almog, et al. (eds.), Themes from
Kaplan, pp. 565-614.
King, Jeffrey.  Complex Demonstratives (Cambridge MA: MIT
Press, 2002).
McDowell, John.  "De Re Senses," Philosophical Quarterly 34
(1984): 283-294.
Neri-Castañeda, Hector.  "'He': A Study in the Logic of Self-
consciousness," Ratio 8 (1966): 130-57.
Peacocke, Christopher.  Sense and Content (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1983).
Perry, John.  The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other
Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
——"Frege on Demonstratives," in The Problem of the Essential
Indexical and Other Essays, pp. 3-32.
——"The Problem of the Essential Indexical," in The Problem
of the Essential Indexical, pp. 33-52.
——and Mark Crimmins.  "The Prince and the Phone Booth:
Reporting Puzzling Beliefs," in The Problem of the Essential
Indexical, pp. 249-78.
Richard, Mark.  "Direct Reference and Ascriptions of Belief,"
Journal of Philosophical Logic 12 (1983): 425-52.
Schiffer, Stephen.  "Indexicals and the Theory of Reference,"
Synthese 49 (1981): 43-100.
Soames, Scott.  Beyond Rigidity (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
2002).
Stanley, Jason.  "Modality and What Is Said," forthcoming in
Philosophical Perspectives.
Taschek, William.  "Frege's Puzzle, Sense, and Information
Content," Mind 101 (1992): 767-91.
